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Abstract: In this paper, we assess the applicability of auctions based on the 
Vickrey second price model for allocating wireless spectrum in developing 
countries. We first provide an overview of auction models for allocating 
resources. We then examine the experience of auctioning spectrum in 
different countries. Based on this examination, we posit some axioms that 
seem to have to be satisfied when allocating spectrum in most developing 
countries. In light of these axioms, we provide a critical evaluation of using 
Vickrey second-price auctions to allocate spectrum in developing countries. 
We suggest the use of a new auction mechanism, the Vickrey “share auction” 
which will satisfy many of these axioms.  
 
                                            
* This paper was prepared for presentation at the 2001 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference 
held in Alexandria, Virginia, October 27-29, 2001. It is an outcome of an earlier paper by Anandalingam, 
Bagchi and Kwon (2000) which specifically looked at spectrum auctions in India.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Many countries are in the process of privatizing their telecommunications systems, 
and are trying to leapfrog technology by speeding up the investment in wireless 
communications. Bandwidth and right-of-way are some of the most important public 
property rights in expanding telecommunications infrastructure. In most countries, right-
of-way whether for wireless or wireline systems is controlled by either local or central 
governments. In the U.S. for instance, there are stringent local municipal rules about 
when and where new telecommunications equipment and networks can be installed 
physically. All countries control the airwaves and only allow companies to use it under 
strict rules. Many of these countries are in the process of allocating the wireless spectrum 
to private operators of telecommunications networks. In this paper, we examine the issues 
involved with allocating spectrum, critique the current methods used in countries like 
India, and use the experience of a number of countries and economic theory to propose a 
new model for spectrum allocation that could work. 
 
1.1. Auctions as a Method for Allocating Spectrum 
 
R.H. Coase in his article, The Federal Communications Commission, makes a 
persuasive argument why the most efficient spectrum policy is to define spectrum as 
property and to let the market decide what it is worth. In comparing frequency policy to 
private property, Coase states: 
 
“Land, labor, and capital are all scarce, but this, of itself, does not call for 
government regulation. It is true that some mechanism has to be employed to 
decide who, out of the many claimants, should be allowed to use the scarce 
resource. But the way this is usually done in the American economic system is to 
employ the price mechanism, and this allocates resources to users without the 
need for government regulation” (See Fritts, 1999) 
 
One of the best available methods for pricing the property rights is to allow the 
market to decide it. However, because spectrum is not a commonly traded commodity, an 
auction mechanism is the best way of discovering the price for the property-right. A 
successful auction of spectrum should result in an efficient distribution of this scarce 
resource to those who are willing to pay the highest price. This is announced as the aim 
of an auction as defined in the FCC report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions 1997, 
quoted in Brian C Fritts (1999). A properly designed auction would give incentive for 
bidders to reveal their true valuation for the spectrum licenses. This would result in 
allocating licenses to those that value the licenses the most, and thus place the licenses in 
the hands of firms that would be able to most efficiently use them. 
 
Moreover, the government can also use the auction to promote objectives like 
development and deployment of technology and services in a speedy fashion, and use 
spectrum licenses to spur economic development and competition, and recovery of the 
commercial value of the spectrum. This is listed as the US Congress objectives for the 
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PCS auctions (Fritts, 1999). Setting up an auction would lead to better and more cost 
effective use of spectrum for all sorts of current and emerging telecommunications 
technology that in the end would provide consumers with cheaper prices and better 
service. With the use of auctions the government would be expected to generate more 
revenue than with other methods; there was also the argument that revenue generated 
from auctions would be much less distortionary than revenue collected via taxes because 
the competitors would bid their true economic value. 
 
 1.2. Experience in Developed Countries in Auctioning Spectrum 
 
The movement towards deregulation of telecommunications industry worldwide 
has recently manifested in the assignment of airwave spectrum via auction mechanisms. 
Countries such as the U.S., England, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have held 
auctions to assign airwave licenses to bidders. In addition, developing countries such as 
India are just beginning to get involved in auctioning off spectrum in order to build out 
their wireless communications infrastructure. The spectrum was initially allocated using 
hearings and lotteries. Next, most of these countries started auctioning off the spectrum 
the same way in which many public infrastructure goods were put out for “tender”. The 
interested parties had to submit bids in response to RFPs (Request For Proposals) 
wherein they delineated their qualifications of being able to build networks, gave plans 
on how and how soon they would build the network, and then provide the monetary value 
of the actual bid for the license including some payment schedule. This sealed-bid first-
price auction was used to choose the entity to which the license should be allocated. 
Finally, most developed countries started using a Vickrey auction mechanism, and a 
variation of it called the ascending price auction mechanism, similar to the English 
auction used to sell precious art. 
 
  New Zealand’s experience of using Vickrey auctions provides the starkest 
evidence of one of its major problems.  Starting from 1989, the New Zealand spectrum 
auctions were of the Vickrey second-price sealed bid variety. In the 1990 auction, the 
winners of some licenses were essentially getting them for free due to the fact that the 
second highest bid would be very low. In one of the 1990 auctions in New Zealand, the 
winning firm’s bid was $100,000, but the second-price was $6 (in New Zealand dollars)! 
Starting from 1991 and continuing to 1994 spectrum auctions in New Zealand went back 
to the first-price sealed bid format. Thus, it appears that the Ministry of Economic 
Development in New Zealand decided that it would rather have winners possibly exposed 
to the winner’s curse rather than having reduced revenues. Starting from 1995 the New 
Zealand Ministry adopted an ascending simultaneous multiple round auction much like 
the one used by the FCC in the U.S. spectrum auctions 
 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the United States pioneered 
the use of the simultaneous ascending-price multiple round (SAMR) auction format 
wherein the bidders were allowed to simultaneously bid for different resources (eg. 
contiguous spectrum) and keep raising their bids in subsequent rounds at increments set 
by the auctioneer until there were no more bids at the last price.  The SAMR is a form of 
Vickrey pricing because the winner only pays an increment above the second-price. (We 
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will elaborate further on all auction mechanisms in section 2).  The countries that used 
this format had also adopted the additional constructs of activity rules, minimum bid 
increments, designated categories, and stopping rules etc. to enable the auction to work 
effectively and efficiently. This is not to say that the auctions were held problem free, 
evidence of collusion was present and it is of course impossible for communications 
ministries to get true efficiency results since firm valuations are not available.  
 
The traditional method of assigning airwave licenses in the U.S. had been through 
lotteries, or comparative assessment hearings. (Details of the U.S. history in allocating 
spectrum can be found in FCC (2001)). Through comparative hearings the FCC would 
employ an administrative judge to decide which prospective license holder was most 
deserving of a license. This process was afflicted by inefficiencies in assigning licenses. 
It would take too long to decide the license assignments among the very many that 
applied and as a result there would be a big backlog of unassigned licenses. In addition, 
firms would often have to spend even more time after the hearings trying to aggregate 
particular licenses from different license holders in order to form geographical synergies 
in their telecommunications networks. As a result, there was considerable delay of new 
communications services offered to customers due to these extra dealings.  
 
The FCC next used a lottery mechanism to assign winners of licenses in a more 
timely fashion. However, this attracted many applicants for licenses, as many small 
telecommunication firms were attracted by the possibility of winning a valuable spectrum 
license it otherwise would have no chance of obtaining. It was not uncommon for small 
companies to win licenses and sell them to larger telecommunications firms afterwards 
for much larger amounts than they paid the government. Again, there were inefficiencies 
due to time delays. Sometimes, the smaller companies could not resell their licenses, and 
had to go into bankruptcy because they could not afford to pay the license fees (for 
example, NextWave Communications). Thus, from 1994 the FCC decided to abandon 
these methods in favor of an auction mechanism.  
 
      Over five days in July 1994 the FCC auctioned off ten nationwide narrowband and 
PCS licenses. The primary use of spectrum associated with these licenses was for 
advanced paging and data services. This auction offered the largest amount of spectrum 
for sale and lasted 47 rounds over five days. There were initially 29 bidders who 
submitted upfront payments and in the end six of the bidders were to claim the ten 
licenses.  The government collected $617 million for the ten narrowband licenses through 
the auction.  
 
       Next the FCC auctioned regional narrowband PCS licenses in October and 
November of 1994. The FCC designated five regions for which six licenses would be 
available per region. Unlike, the nationwide narrowband auction, geographical 
aggregation would be a critical issue in this auction as firms would be competing for 
multiple licenses to form synergies. The auction started with 28 bidders for 30 regional 
licenses and nine firms won the licenses. It took 105 rounds and the government collected 
$395 million dollars in revenue. The MTA broadband auctions began on December 5, 
1994. This auction would be the largest public auction and most important spectrum 
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auction ever with 99 licenses being auctioned, and 30 bidders (including some of the 
largest telecommunications firms in the world) competing for licenses whose sale 
culminated in over $7 billion in revenue. The FCC continues to use SAMR auctions to 
this day. 
 
Australian government had some adverse experience in the auctioning of licenses 
for satellite-television services. A first-price sealed bid auction was used to auction two 
satellite-television services in April 1993. The winners of the two licenses defaulted on 
their bids, and caused a cascade of defaults until the next highest bidder was found that 
could pay for his/her bid. The final prices actually paid were on the order of 100 million 
dollars less than the original bids. The Australian government then decided to use a 
simultaneous ascending-price multiple-round (SAMR) auction mechanism (with bid 
default penalty mechanisms) in 1997, and continues to use this auction format 
predominantly for spectrum license assignment. 
   
In 1997, 838 spectrum licenses, ranging from 12.5 Khz to 1 Mhz, were put up for 
auction using the simultaneous ascending format. In April and May 1998 the PCS auction 
raised 350 million dollars in revenue with 2.7 million dollars in withdrawal penalties.  
The second PCS auction in September 1998 raised 30.631 million dollars. The auction 
held in February 1999 ended in 38 rounds and raised 66.2 million dollars (one bidder, 
AAPT LMDS Pty Ltd, claimed all licenses). The third PCS auction was similar to the 
second: only one bidder registered and this sole bidder paid the reservation price of 
$20,000 to obtain the license. Motorola Australia Ltd bid $47,000 to win both licenses in 
the April 1999 auction. Finally, the April 2000 1.8 Ghz PCS auction ended in 138 rounds 
and raised 1.32 billion dollars.  
 
The United Kingdom held its first auction for spectrum in March 2000 by using a 
simultaneous ascending auction for five spectrum licenses for 3rd generation wireless 
communications. These licenses would be some of the most sought after licenses because 
access to the associated spectrum would enable the creation of many innovative mobile 
communications devices that will soon dominate the telecommunications industry e.g. 
mobile internet. The largest license would be reserved for a new entrant into the UK 
telecommunications market.  
 
        The decision to use a simultaneous ascending auction was based on the successful 
experience of the FCC in their use of the auction format. Thirteen bidders competed for 
the 5 licenses and five bidders won five licenses in this UK spectrum auction that lasted 
150 rounds spanning two months. The reserve price for the five licenses was five hundred 
million pounds sterling. Collectively, the five licenses netted over 22 billion pounds. 
  
Canada also has been a recent entrant into the world of spectrum auctioning. Like 
most countries, Canada used to assign spectrum licenses through administrative hearings 
but soon came to realize the inefficiencies of such an approach. Like other countries 
Canada has also adopted the simultaneous ascending auction format pioneered by the 
FCC. Recent auctions involved the auctioning of licenses in the 24 to 28 Ghz band. 12 
bidders competed for 260 licenses and the auction revenues totaled 171 million dollars. 
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The auction lasted 24 days (Oct. 18, 1999 to Nov. 19, 1999) and went through 117 
rounds.  
 
What is clear from these cases is that the simultaneous ascending-price multiple 
round auctions are becoming the most popular way to allocate spectrum in most 
developed countries. Developing countries work under conditions that are different 
enough for one to take a closer look at Vickrey auctions and Vickrey based SAMR 
auctions to see if they are really applicable. This is the main objective of this paper. 
While the auctioneer in a developed country designs the auction in order to maximize 
revenue, at a minimum the governments in most developing countries who are far behind 
in the telecommunications revolution would like to have networks in place, whether or 
not they get the maximum license revenues. Further, any auction that takes too long or 
involves too complicated a set of calculations will allow non-transparent corrupt practices 
to enter into the process. We will look at the particular conditions in a developing 
country, and use the case of India’s foray into telecom privatization to propose axioms 
that have to be satisfied by any auction mechanism that would work in these places. We 
will then present a novel idea based on Vickrey auctions that may have potential. 
 
1.3. Organization of the Paper 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we describe the three most 
popular auction mechanisms and discuss the pros and cons of each. In section 3, we give 
details on India’s case in auctioning off telecom property. In section 4, we propose some 
axioms for conducting auctions in developing countries. In section 5, we discuss the 
limitations of the Vickrey and SAMR auction in satisfying these axioms. In section 6, we 
present the Vickrey share auction. We end the paper with concluding remarks in section 
7. 
 
 
2. Auction formats 
 
We will first describe different auction formats that have been used for spectrum 
allocation, and discuss the pros and cons of each (See also Agorics, 1996). In conjunction 
with the international practice that we described earlier, we will see why Vickrey 
auctions, especially the ascending price Vickrey auctions, have good theoretical 
properties that recommend them. In the next section, we will describe the experience of 
using these different auction formats in a developing country like India. 
 
2.1. First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: 
 
The simplest method and probably the most popular is the sealed bid format where 
different telecommunications companies would bid for the right to use the airwaves using 
a single sealed bid. This method is widely practiced in a number of industries, especially 
in civil engineering works, and was the methodology of choice used in the first set of 
cellular auctions in the telecommunications sector in India.  
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There are two main advantages of the first-price sealed-bid auction: First, it is simple, 
and merely involves all interested parties submitting a single bid for the resource that is 
being auctioned. Secondly, it is economically efficient in that the resource, in this case 
the license to use the spectrum, is given to the one who claims to value it the most.  
 
There are a number of problems also. There is no guarantee that the bidders will 
reveal their true value for the resource. Thus, it may well be that a bidder who does not 
truly value the resource the highest will obtain it. There is significant pressure to do “bid 
shading”, i.e. to lower the bid below the actual value of the resource to you. The entity 
winning the bid might be able to sell to a losing entity which values the resource higher 
but “shaded” their bid too much. Thus, the auctioneer may obtain a lower revenue than if 
the bidders bid truthfully. Although in most auctions the rules of the game make 
collusion illegal, there may be incentives to collude and lower the bids, and subsequent to 
the auction for the bidders to engage in a secondary market.  
 
Another major problem of a sealed bid “auction” is what economists’ call the 
“Winner’s Curse”. In a first-price sealed bid auction, it is often the case that the winner 
may far more than it should; e.g. the difference between the winning bid and the second 
highest bid would often be quite large. With this scenario, the auctioneer gets very high 
revenue if the winner follows the rules of the game. However, the winner of the auction 
may either balk at paying too much, or may be unable to built out the network having 
paid too much for the license. In some cases, the winner might actually go bankrupt (for 
example, NextWave Communications in the U.S. that we mentioned earlier) by 
borrowing a lot to bid high, but by not being able to service this debt in the loan period 
through revenue generation. 
 
Note that the first-price sealed-bid auction is similar to what is called a “Dutch 
auction”. In a Dutch auction, used to sell tulips, the auctioneer starts with a given (usually 
high) price for the resource and then progressively lowers its asking price. The person 
who cries out the first bid for a resource gets it; the one with the highest or first price gets 
the resource being auctioned. 
 
 
2.2. Sealed-Bid Vickrey Auctions: 
 
In order, to design truth-revealing auctions, Vickrey (1961) came up with a second-
price auction. Sealed-bid Vickrey auctions are those where the winner of an auction gets 
the resource but only has to pay the price of the second highest bidder to obtain it. 
Second-price auctions like the Vickrey auction are supposed to reduce this winner’s curse 
by allowing the winner of the auction to pay the second highest bid. Like the first-price 
auction, the bids are sealed, and each bidder is ignorant of other bids unless there is 
collusion. The item is awarded to highest bidder at a price equal to the second-highest bid 
(or highest unsuccessful bid). In other words, a winner pays less than the highest bid. If, 
for example, bidder A bids $10 million B bids $15 million and C offers $20 million, 
bidder C would win, however he would only pay the price of the second-highest bid, 
namely $15 million.  
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Vickrey auctions are both economically efficient and truth revealing. It is easy to 
show that, because the winning bidder needs only pay the second highest bid, there is no 
incentive to “cheat” and misrepresent the true value of the resource. Additionally, in a 
Vickrey auction, the highest bidder always gets the resource, or spectrum in this case; 
thus, it is economically efficient. 
One wonders why any seller would choose this method to auction goods. It seems 
obvious that a seller would make more money by using a first-price auction, but, in fact, 
that has been shown to be untrue (Agorics, 1996). Bidders fully understand the rules and 
modify their bids as circumstances dictate. In the case of a Vickrey auction, bidders 
adjust upward. No one is deterred out of fear that he will pay too high a price. Aggressive 
bidders receive sure and certain awards but pay a price closer to market consensus. The 
price that the winning bidder pays should theoretically be determined by competitors' 
bids alone and does not depend upon any action the bidder undertakes. Less bid shading 
or collusion would occur because people don't fear Winner’s Curse, and thus the seller 
might well receive higher revenue in a Vickrey auction. Myerson (1981) proved that the 
expected revenue under both a sealed-bid first-price auction and a Vickrey auction 
(sealed-bid or English) was the same; i.e. the revenue equivalence theorem. 
Of course, there is nothing to prevent a general sense of risk aversion in which all 
bidders would “shade” their bids. In this case, certainly the auctioneer will receive lower 
revenue. The auctioneer can be insincere and try to increase the value of the second 
highest bid. This can be done in two ways: Either overstate the second highest bid 
without actually revealing it, or else get a proxy to bid high and only allocate the resource 
if there is a bid higher than the proxy bid. Neither is usually allowed in legal Vickrey 
auctions, and a number of mechanisms are used to ensure that the auctioneer does not 
behave in an insincere manner. For a sealed-bid Vickrey auction to be above suspicion, 
the auctioneer, at the end of the auction, will have to reveal the value of all the bids and 
also the identity of all who made them.   
 
2.3. Simultaneous Ascending Multiple Round Auctions 
 
Another auction mechanism that takes care of the issue of transparency, and also 
fits the Vickrey second-price framework is the simultaneous ascending multiple round 
(SAMR) auction. The bidders bid on the resource in a round, and the auctioneer then 
raises the minimum bid by an increment and allows the bidders to bid again in the 
subsequent round. The auction stops when no bidder accepts the auctioneer’s increment 
and revises his bid upward.  This is very similar to the English auction. The main 
difference between a SAMR auction and an English auction is that the latter is an open-
cry auction while the former need not be.  SAMR auctions are economically efficient in 
that the highest bidder gets the resource, and is Vickrey in the sense that the winning 
bidder obtains the resource at the second-best price plus a small increment. Thus, the 
SAMR auction is incentive compatible in that, theoretically, there is no incentive to bid 
untruthfully. One further nicety of the auction is that the winning bidder neither has to 
reveal the exact value of the resource to it all at once, nor even at the end because the 
auction stops after an incremental bid above the second highest, bid.  
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The ascending nature of the simultaneous ascending auction is supposed to help 
bidders dynamically bid for various licenses as a bidder can re-evaluate future bids in up 
and coming rounds by utilizing information from the bids placed by other bidders during 
a current round. Thus, the winner’s curse can be reduced by the observation of competing 
bids during a round i.e. it would be unlikely for a bidder to bid in tremendous excess of a 
current high bid by accident. In addition, the ascending aspect does not allow bidders to 
submit new bids that are lower than previous bids. This feature allows for more revenue 
generation, which is obviously beneficial from the government’s point of view. 
 
As described in the Introduction, the FCC of the United States became the first 
regulator to use SAMR auctions to allocate spectrum at the recommendation of leading 
economic theorists. SAMR auctions are also much more easily amenable to the 
auctioning off of multiple licenses, thus allowing bidders to bid on combinations of 
licenses that will form synergies e.g. licenses that correspond to contiguous geographic 
regions will allow firms to have economies-of-scale in serving a larger region not to 
mention a larger customer base. Also, synergies may be formed with existing licenses 
that firms own, and so synergies may come from sets of licenses up for auction that do 
not necessarily form contiguous geographic coverage by themselves, but do so in 
combination with existing licenses owned by firms. So the logic here is that firms would 
obviously take these factors into consideration when deciding how to value and bid for 
different licenses and thus a high valuation for a set of licenses would reflect that these 
licenses would add great value to the firm. Thus, given that highest bidders win auctions 
then it would be very beneficial to use auctions to allocate these scarce resources 
(spectrum) so that firms that are highest bidders (i.e. firms that would most likely make 
most efficient use of spectrum) would end up with the licenses. 
 
SAMR auctions do not necessarily prevent collusions whereby all of the bidders 
bid low. In order to ensure some level of revenue, the auctioneer might actually post a 
reservation price and only accept bids above it. This practice is quite common in the 
English auctions used to sell precious art in Sotheby’s and Christie’s.  
 
3. Telecom Auctions in Developing Countries: The Case of India 
 
In India, the opening up of the telecommunications services sector to full competition 
began in earnest in the early 1990’s.  The paradox of millions of unfulfilled applications, 
abundance of inexpensive telecommunications equipment and no new telecom services 
prodded the government as well as the political intelligentsia to rethink the fundamentals 
of the sector (EPW, 2000). Moreover, there was a growing realization among policy 
makers that good telecommunication networks can help propel a country’s economic 
growth trajectory into a higher sphere, especially in the information age.  
 
The proponents of dismantling the monopolistic regime of the service operator were 
also helped by swift technological changes. The digitization of telecommunications 
required huge new investments in the wireline network in order for India to upgrade its 
telecommunications infrastructure which existing firms were not in a position to make. 
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The state operator was also unable to invest in cellular technology and offer wireless 
services to the Indian customers.  
 
In 1991, the government decided that services like cellular telephony, radio paging, e-
mail, internet, audio and video-conferencing, V-SAT-based data networks, voicemail, 
videotex were termed as “Value Added” and made the domain of the private sector 
(Achar, 1995).  In May 1994, the New Telecommunications Policy was adopted, and 
basic (wireline) telephony was also formally opened up for private sector investment. 
There are lessons to be learned from both the spectrum auctions and also from the 
wireline (“basic services”) license auctions. We will first examine the latter because the 
results of using a sealed-bid first-price auction were stark, and counterproductive from 
the perspective of the country. 
 
 3.1. Auctions for Basic Wireline Services 
 
In order to auction licenses for wireline services, India was divided into 20 “circles” 
(or regional divisions) which were then put up for bid to allow one private operator to 
enter each circle and compete with the government monopoly, the Department of 
Telecommunications. The applications for licenses to operate in each circle were all 
supposed to be first-price sealed bids, and the government was explicit how they were to 
be evaluated. In order to ensure a balanced nationwide growth in telecommunication 
services especially in the rural areas, the pre-conditions for participating in the license 
auctions included: 
 
• The private entity had to be a joint company formed with the participation of an 
Indian company 
• Licensees must give at least 10 per cent of all lines to rural areas 
• The licensee’s network must cover all the districts in the area within 24 months 
• Prices charged by the DoT (where it was the competitor) would be ceiling for the 
prices that private sector firms could charge; of course, they had the freedom to 
charge a lower rate (Chowdary, 1995) 
 
However, when it came to evaluating the bids at the auctions, the government’s 
motives reflected the need to use the bidding process to generate revenues. Only 15% 
weight was given to the speed at which the network would be rolled out, 10% was given 
for rural coverage, and 3% for indigenous equipment used in the network. A “whopping” 
72% weight was for the level of the license fee bid (Dokeniya, 1999). 
 
Even so, many foreign telecommunications companies participated in the bidding for 
the right to offer basic (wireline) telephony in India. The main attraction was the then 
widely used number of 250 million “middle class” potential customers, and the waiting 
list of more than 3 million. Companies that bid included multinational like AT&T, US 
West, Bell Atlantic, Nynex (at that time a separate company), NTT, and Bell Canada, and 
small ones like Bezeq of Israel, and Shinawatra of Thailand. Their Indian partners 
included the Tatas, the Birlas, RPG, Reliance, BPL, Essar, Shyam Telecom and Himachal 
Futurisatic Communications Limited (HFCL).  
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The first round of the basic service (wireline) auction attracted 80 bids for 40 licenses 
from 16 companies. In 7 of the circles (Delhi, Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, 
Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh West), the bids followed some level of rationality. In circles 
where HFCL was the highest bidder, their bid was higher than any of the second placed 
bids, and almost higher than all of the remaining bids combined (Dokeniya, 1999). 
Clearly, because of the problems of insufficient information about an industry that they 
were planning to enter, their valuations were completely off that of the others, and they 
were plainly subject to the well known “winner’s curse”.  
 
The first bidding round unraveled due to a number of issues. Many companies 
objected to HFCL being the winner in all the circles in which they participated. HFCL 
also wanted to back out of some of the circles in which they had won for fear of being 
unable to pay all the license fees. Further, many circles received either one bid or no bids 
which was considered unsatisfactory. Thus, the government had to call for a second 
round of bidding for basic (wireline) services.  
 
The second round was also affected by some structural problems. Because the more 
lucrative (grade A) circles had been awarded in the first round, the only circles let for bid 
in the second round were the less lucrative circles. In the circles in which HFCL reneged, 
the government specified a minimum bid which was considered too high by most 
participants. In addition, caution among the players and the lack of credibility about the 
outcome of auction lead to only six bids. Thus, at the end of the bidding process, of the 
21 circles (largely similar to the state boundaries) that were put up for auctions, only 6 
licenses were issued for Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab 
and Rajasthan. Currently (circa Auguat 2001), the roll-out of basic wireline telephony has 
been slow at best. 
 
 3.2. Spectrum Auctions for Cellular Services 
 
In accordance with the policy espoused by the government in 1991, the 
Department of Telecommunications initiated the licensing of eight mobile licenses in the 
four major metropolitan cities of Chennai, Mumbai, New Delhi and Calcutta along with 
paging services in 26 major cities.  
 
The cellular licenses for the four metropolitan cities were auctioned through a 
single sealed-bid auction for two licenses in each city (i.e. 8 licenses in total). In such a 
process, all applicants were allowed to submit one sealed bid to apply for the license. The 
selection criteria employed for allocating licenses was supposed to be the license, the 
speed of roll-out, tariffs, reputation and experience of the firms. However, the Indian 
Metro cellular auction lacked transparency because the selection criteria were not 
announced publicly, unlike in the later case of the basic (wireline) services, before the 
bids were made (Dokeniya, 1999). Consequently, the winners of the auction seemed 
subjective at best and arbitrary at worst and the losers took recourse to the courts. It was 
after a long legal dispute among the participants of the auction and the Department of 
Telecommunications that the eight licenses were finally awarded in July 1995. As per the  
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Name of Circle Bidder I Value of Bid Bidder II Value of Bid 
Group A  ($m)  ($m) 
Andhra  JT Mobile 319 BPL 308 
Gujarat Birla AT&T 571 BPL 393 
Karnataka Modi 444 (a) Birla 420 
   (b) JT Mobile 420 
Maharashtra Birla AT&T 528 BPL 466 
Tamil Nadu BPL 266 Hinduja-HCL 172 
Group B     
Haryana Escotel  78 Aircell Digilink 76 
Kerala BPL 165 Escotel 123 
Madhya Pradesh CellularComm 19 Reliance 2 
Punjab Modi 403 JT Mobile 123 
Rajasthan Modi 122 Aircell Digilink 67 
UP (East) Modi 72 Koshika 67 
UP (West) Escotel 129 Koshika 82 
West Bengal Reliance 13 No bidder  
Group C     
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
No bids    
Assam Reliance 0.4 No bidder  
Bihar Koshika 43 Reliance 0.8 
Himachal Pradesh Bharti telnet 5 Reliance 0.4 
Orissa Koshika  28 Reliance 0.8 
North-East Hexacom 0.5 Reliance 0.4 
Jammu Kashmir No bids    
 
Table 1: Bidding for Cellular Services in India 
 
 
terms of the license, the winners had to pay a fixed sum as license fees in the first three 
years before they switched to paying on a per-line basis. 
 
The second round of cellular auctions for 40 licenses in 20 states was held in 
1995. Again, there was a single sealed bid auction. And once again, the DoT did not 
specify the selection criteria involved. However, it was well known that the prime 
criterion for the award of licenses for cellular, mobile telephony, 2-way paging was the 
highest license fee (EPW, 2000). 
 
Bidding for the cellular licenses was a gamble because the private companies 
lacked proper market research on telephone usage in any particular area. The DoT, the 
only company with data on telecom usage and demand patters made no attempt to share 
such information with prospective bidders either (EPW, 2000). A further complication 
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was the fact that the Indian partners, by and large, in the telecom venture had no 
experience in the telecommunications business.  
 
For the government of India, despite the problems of the auctions and the 
unrealistic high bids, the cellular licenses raised over $7 billion. However, this method of 
licensing though a single sealed bid auction without any information of the selection 
criteria has led to many problems in the cellular sector.  
 
There is little doubt that the bidders overestimated revenues and demand patterns. 
However, the high license fees which formed 50 per cent of the total roll-out cost for a 
cellular operator led to high tariffs for the consumers. This in turn impacted demand for 
these services. Moreover, the license fees had to be paid up front every year. That is, it 
did not matter whether the new operators had a network, subscribers, traffic or revenues, 
but they had to pay an up front fixed fee to the government every year.  
 
Given the high sunk cost of initial investment, the lower than expected subscriber 
base and the high license fees, cellular operators in India, with the exception of those in 
Mumbai and New Delhi markets have been posting losses from the outset. In 1999, the 
cellular telephone industry was posting losses of $92 million every month (Achar, 1999). 
Industry experts say that overestimation of market size and usage was the main culprit 
with companies, which had projected 300 minutes of usage, could get subscribers to 
barely talk for 100 minutes in a month. Besides, average revenue per user was only $23 
compared to projections, which had ranged between $41 and $58 per month. As a result 
by July 1999, the private cellular companies owed almost $900 million in license fees to 
the government and many had decided to exit the business completely (Achar, 1999). 
 
Given all the problems experienced in both the cellular and wireline liberalization 
and privatization process, the government of India decided to introduce some changes. In 
September 1999, inspite of opposition lead by the Congress Party, the BJP government 
decided to implement a new National Telecom Policy which allowed the private sector 
operators in the telecommunication service providers to shift from a license fee regime to 
a revenue sharing one. The only caveat, which companies accepted gladly, was that in 
order to qualify for the new revenue sharing arrangement, they would have to withdraw 
their pending court cases against the government. All the twenty-nine firms, including 22 
cellular operators decided to move to the new arrangement. Of course, the actual level of 
the revenue being shared has become an ex poste negotiated amount based on the 
company and the region in which it is operating.  
 
After shifting to the revenue sharing regime, which also led to a lower cost for 
subscriber because of 25 per cent lower rental charges, the cellular market grew 
significantly between April 1999 and March 2000 by over 80 per cent in terms of revenue 
and 58 per cent in terms of subscribers. At the end of March 2000, there were 1.88 
million cellular subscribers, with an addition of 650,000 during the year. However, there 
are still 6 slots that are yet to be auctioned off in four different circles.  
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4. Some Axioms for Conducting Auctions in Developing Countries 
 
There are some important lessons to be learned about conducting spectrum 
auctions in developing countries where the objective and subjective conditions are very 
different from that in the U.S. Based on many years of experience with development 
projects, many of these conditions could have been articulated ex-ante the conduct of 
actual spectrum auctions in countries like India. However ex-poste the experience, the 
axioms that we articulate are much more powerful.  
 
First of all, the reasons why most governments in developing countries are 
auctioning off the airwaves to private telecommunications operators is because these 
countries do not have sufficient funds to build the wireless networks. Secondly, in most 
countries, there is very little technology or technical skills to actually design, build and 
manage telecommunications networks, wireline or wireless. Thus auctions enable the 
countries to allow global telecommunications companies to enter the country, albeit at a 
cost for obtaining the “right-of-way”. Of course in order to have some control over an 
infrastructure good, these ”foreign” companies are often made to ally with some local 
entity, or at least obtain a significant amount of materials and human resources from local 
sources. Thus, after the spectrum licenses are won, there would a need to negotiate the 
prices and quantities of many inputs going into build the networks with local suppliers. 
 
Thirdly, there is the issue of the governments averting the risk of getting into a 
reasonably fresh field enterprise in order to safeguard their finances for more immediate 
necessities like food, water, health, shelter and education. Thus, the telcos, especially if 
they win will be dealing with a market that is new and unused to telecommunications 
services. They will have to learn, sometimes while “doing”, about the consumers’ 
(residential, business, and commercial) willingness-to-pay and price elasticities for 
different services. Thus revenue estimates would be very tricky to make. They also have 
to estimate the cost of the telecom networks with little or no reliable data from the past. 
Even in countries where there is already a reasonably well established state controlled 
network, because of subsidies etc., the cost of building the network would not translate 
easily to a private venture. Thus there would be significant uncertainty about exactly 
what the value of the spectrum would be, and how this added license cost would impact 
the profitability of the venture. 
 
It is extremely important for the developing country government to allow fair and 
transparent auctions. In the situation where the country depends on the technological 
expertise and financial entrepreneurship of a global telecommunications company, an 
environment should be created to enable them to participate in the current auction, and 
any future auctions that may be necessary in order to expand the network. The rules of 
the auction should be straightforward and clear, including who should participate, what 
they are bidding for, and when the auction ends. 
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Axiom 1: The auction should treat all participants equally and fairly, and should be 
transparent in both the rules of the auction and the outcome. It is best for the auction 
rules to be simple.  
 
It is clear that the governments are using the spectrum auctions to raise money for 
their exchequers. Thus, an auction that makes sense from the point of view of the 
developing country government has to have the potential to raise significant license fees. 
The auction mechanism should enable those participating agents to bid as high as their 
individual valuation of the spectrum (i.e. reveal true values). This objective is not very 
different from that in most developed countries around the world as the recent experience 
in Europe has shown. However, most developing country governments would be happy 
to trade off incentive compatibility requirements provided that they obtain license fees 
above what they consider to be true value of the resource. 
 
Axiom 2: The auction should have the potential to provide as much revenue for the public 
treasury as the value placed on the resource by the government.   
 
Even more importantly, and also due to the lack of available funds, most Third 
World governments would like to have the wireless networks actually implemented in 
order to expand telecommunications services in their country. Even if one does not take 
into account the consumption tax that could be collected on communications revenues, it 
is clear to most governments around the world that their countries need to be part of the 
telecommunications revolution, and allow their citizens to easily access the Internet. 
Thus, the auction is considered mostly as a way to provide right-of-way for a serious 
telco to move forward and build out the network. Indeed, in most developing countries, 
most bidders have to be pre-qualified to bid in auctions, and most new entrants into the 
global telecommunications industry are subject to fairly intense scrutiny, frequently to be 
disqualified. 
 
Axiom 3: The auction should be just the initial stage in a rapid build-out of the (wireless) 
telecommunications network. 
 
Due to the fact that most people in developing countries, by definition, have a low 
disposable income, the network that is built should be as cost effective as possible. This 
means that the government should really work in partnership with those who have won 
the right to build the network in order to keep the cost low. This does not mean that the 
government should entertain a downward re-negotiation of the outcome of the spectrum 
auction. In fact, if this were to happen, both axiom 1 and 2 above would get violated. 
What it means is that the government should enable the winning telco to pursue all 
activities subsequent to the auction with efficacy and expediency, with a focus on 
keeping costs low. Indeed, the auction design and winning the license should not lead to 
an adverse effect on subsequent network cost. 
 
Axiom 4: The auction design should ensure that the subsequent to its completion that the 
network could be built and deployed at the lowest possible cost. 
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As the experience in India shows, if the auction does not lead to a conclusive 
outcome expeditiously, then it could be subject to a number of untoward influences. To 
be clear, in most developing countries, given the amount of money involved in these 
spectrum auctions, if the conclusions are not known rapidly and transparently, it could be 
the subject of corruption from even those Ministries involved with designing the auction. 
Thus, one of the most important considerations in a developing country is to have these 
auctions conducted in a way that final results can be made public soon. 
 
Axiom 5: The auction design should ensure a rapid conclusion to the auction. 
 
 
5. Limitations of the Vickrey Second-Price Auction 
 
 Competition: Both too much competition and too little competition affects the 
outcome of the Vickrey auction from the perspective of the developing country. The most 
common occurrence in developing countries around the world is too little competition. 
There are a number of reasons for this, the main one being the general risk aversion of 
telecommunications companies going to countries where the disposable income is very 
low. Exacerbating this risk averse behavior are the conditions that are imposed by most 
countries in order to ensure that local companies are partners in telecommunications 
ventures. This “local content” rule takes many forms, the most common being the 
imposition of a certain ownership requirement (usually 51% or more) of any joint venture 
bidding on telecom licenses. Given this conditionality, there are very few companies in 
the U.S. and Europe who are willing to be minority partners in telecom ventures, and if 
they are, there are very few local companies with either the technology capability or 
execution wherewithal to partner with. The end result is a low level of competition, 
usually 2-3 companies bidding for the spectrum licenses, and a result that is close to the 
New Zealand case where the second-price is very low, leading to a bargain for the 
winning firm and insignificant revenues for the government. In a situation of low 
competition, the use of a Vickrey auction will violate axioms 2 above, and most likely 
axiom 1 as well. 
 
 Too much competition leads to some counter intuitive behavior. In the sealed-bid 
Vickrey auction, it is clear that the bidders should bid more aggressively if they are faced 
with more competition. Every bidder is supposed to have some private information about 
his valuation of the resource (eg., the wireless spectrum), and usually bids something 
lower than that value, thereby realizing a “profit” (value – bid). As there is more and 
more competition, to maximize the chances of winning, the bidder needs to trade off the 
profit, and make bids much closer to the valuation. Thus, too much competition should be 
good for the auctioneer because of aggressive bidding. However, if the winners end up 
bidding much more than any one else, then there could be the advent of Winner’s curse, 
leading to the desire to renegotiate the license fee, or slow down the building of the 
network. Thus, too much competition coupled with over aggressive bidding could lead to 
conditions where axiom 3 will be violated, and perhaps even axiom 5. 
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In the case of telecommunications, most bidders have the same information about 
the marketplace (i.e. who will be their customers, how many customers they will have, 
and how much they will be willing to pay), and the technology (what does it cost to build 
out a network, and what is the cost of capital). Thus, one can argue that the resource 
being auctioned off has common value rather than private value. Thus, while different 
bidders might estimate this value slightly differently, the basis of the estimation has to be 
common. When faced with significant competition, the person who wins will be the one 
who over estimates the value of the resource. If the bidding is done rationally, the bidders 
should compensate for this selection bias by bidding less aggressively. Thus, rather than 
being good for the auctioneer, rational behavior in a common value auction which should 
lead to under bidding, will lower revenue (Rothkopf, 2000). In this case, axiom 2 will be 
violated. 
 
A further problem with too much competition stems from overhead costs for the 
auctioneer. With every new bidder, the auctioneer, the developing country government, 
has to perform due diligence, prepare bid forms and formats, participation mechanisms 
etc. Thus, the net revenue would be reduced by having to incur the additional 
administrative costs of too much competition. 
 
Delays and the Potential for Rule Changes: If, in the common value auction, the 
bidders do not compensate for the selection bias and continues to bid aggressively, the 
one who wins will realize what we described as “winner’s curse”. Clearly, the winner 
would have made the most optimistic estimate of the resource that has a common value to 
all the bidders. The entity that obtains the license will be extremely concerned about over 
bidding, as that which happened in India for basic services, leading to either flight or an 
attempt to renegotiate the bid price for the license. In this case too, the auctioneers 
revenue will be reduced. Given the time taken for recovering from a winner who 
“defaults”, axiom 5 will certainly be violated. In addition, unless the government is 
unwavering in it’s reluctance to change the license fee, axiom 1 will be violated. If the 
winner slows down the building of the network because of all these activities, axiom 3 
will be violated. 
 
Third Party Negotiations: In the case of spectrum auctions, winning the resource 
is not the end of the story; the network has to be built. In developing countries, where the 
bidding is done by international firms (in partnership with local firms), the network 
would be built by using local third parties who will provide a number of inputs including 
labor, materials and some technology, the prices of which need to be negotiated. Further, 
these third parties neither have had a long-term relationship with the winning Telco, nor 
do they expect to in the future. In every country, there would be a demand to use their 
own local suppliers for labor and materials. Thus, these third-party negotiations would be 
a one-shot deal, and the Vickrey auction format could be problematic. 
 
From the arguments outlined in section 4, it is clear that the Vickrey auction 
needs to be transparent in that all bids, including who made the bids, have to be 
announced at the end of the auction. The winning party in a Vickrey second-price auction 
will pay less than their bid, the difference may well be significant. Third parties with 
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whom the Telcos have to negotiate will know the “profit” (bid minus second-price) that 
the latter obtained from the license auction itself, and will try to extract a considerable 
amount of it, increasing the final cost of the network (Rothkopf et al, 1990). All of this 
will lead to the violation of axiom 4.  
 
What should be done, knowing that the third-party negotiations would increase 
network cost? The auctioneer can use some kind of encryption that limits knowledge 
about the bids to only the participants of the auction. However, keeping this knowledge 
secret is extremely difficult in most countries, and would be virtually impossible in a 
developing country. A number of options are available to bidders, including bid shading 
(i.e. all bidders simply bid a little less, thus violating incentive compatibility), and 
inclusion of all third-party suppliers in the bidding consortium (increasing effective cost 
and lowering net value of the resource). In either case, the auctioneer, i.e. the developing 
country government, will lose expected revenue.  
 
Bidding with Financial Constraints: Much of the literature on auctions assumes 
that the bidders care about winning but bid only up to their individual valuation of the 
resource. In the Vickrey second-price auction bidders truthfully bid their actual valuation. 
In many cases, especially in developing countries, the bidders might not be able to bid 
their valuation because of financial constraints. Capital markets might allow the bidders 
to obtain financing for a lower amount than what bidders think the licenses are worth.  
This financial constraint is usually dynamic in the sense that it may be different at 
different periods of the evolution of the telecommunications service. At the time of the 
auction, financial institutions may not be very optimistic about the chances of winning, or 
more importantly, the chances of successfully (i.e. profitably) implementing a network. 
As the spectrum licenses are bid, and the network is built out, this risk aversion would get 
moderated, and further capital outlays would materialize. When the wireless telecom 
services are actually sold, and as the customer base expands, the financial constraints 
might get further alleviated.   
 
Thus, a financially constrained Vickrey auction would certainly lead to a number 
of inadequate outcomes. First, the actual bids would be the financially constraints rather 
than the value of the resource. In each country, this would reflect overall country risk 
rather than the value of wireless communications. Clearly, the auctioneer, i.e. the 
developing country government, will lose revenue because of this. Secondly, the winners 
would be those who are well connected to the capital markets rather than those 
necessarily able to implement the network effectively. One could argue that the ability to 
arrange financing is a reflection of the expectations of the capital markets regarding the 
success of the bidder in executing the project. However, given the recent valuation 
meltdown of the telecommunications sector, one cannot be sanguine about this. If there is 
no congruence between those who can arrange financing for the spectrum bids and those 
who can execute the network, the developing country will lose out in the long run by not 
having telecommunications service. This will violate axioms 2 and 3, and perhaps even 
axiom 4. 
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Value Uncertainty: Models of auctions, including Vickrey second-price auctions 
assume that the bidders know the value of the resource, for example the spectrum. In the 
case of auctions in developed countries, one could argue that this assumption is 
reasonable. The telecommunications market is fairly well developed, and most companies 
know the price elasticities of the consumers, business and residential, and the size of the 
markets in each segment. The cost of building out the network is also known with a 
reasonable degree of certainty. Further, a number of spectrum auctions themselves have 
been conducted over the years, and the bidders have learned the art and science of 
valuing wireless spectrum. As a caveat, however, the 3G auctions in Europe show that 
the need to obtain “right-of-way” for new technologies will lead to completely unlearned 
speculative behavior.  
 
In the case of developing countries, the notion that those participating in spectrum 
auctions will have a good knowledge of the value of the resource is overly optimistic. If 
there is uncertainty, then the behavior of the bidder’s will not elicit truth revealing that 
the Vickrey second-price auctions are supposed to. Two of the major problems of 
conducting a Vickrey auction in a situation with uncertainty are untruthful bidding, and 
wasteful counter speculation. Risk neutral bidders, i.e. those with linear utility functions, 
are best off bidding the expected value of their valuation of the spectrum in a single-shot 
private value Vickrey auction. However, those who bid for spectrum in developing 
countries are mostly risk averse; their utility functions are concave functions of the 
payoffs. Sandholm (1996) proves that risk averse bidder’s with uncertainty about the 
value of the resource will not bid their expected value in a single-shot Vickrey auction. In 
fact, in the case of value uncertainty, the optimal bid for a risk averse bidder is to bid less 
than their estimated expected value. This will lead to two outcomes: a lowering of 
expected revenues for the auctioneer, and the potential of winner’s curse because those 
who win will be the ones who may be least risk averse at the advent of the auction, but 
who might be unhappy with their bid subsequent to it.  
 
The second result of uncertainty in the value of the resource is “counter 
speculation” whereby the bid of each agent is based on speculations about what the other 
bidders would do. It should be recalled that one of the main motivations of the Vickrey 
auctions was that the dominant strategy for each bidder was to bid truthfully without any 
consideration for the bids of other participants in the auction. Sandholm (1996) proved 
that in situations of “local” uncertainty about the value of the resource, even a risk neutral 
bidder would have the incentive to counter speculate. The main reason for this is that all 
bidders will try and take some action to reduce the uncertainty in their own (i.e. “local”) 
valuations. Given two different bidders, each of who has a different level of local 
uncertainty, the optimal amount of information that one of them should collect would 
depend on how much is needed to get closer to the other. Conversely, rather than 
collecting this information, the agents bid might compensate for the difference in the 
levels of information each of them has. Indeed, it is a common practice in most 
developing country auctions to speculate about whether or not the other bidders have a 
favored status with the auctioneer, and hence more information about the value of the 
spectrum or not.  
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In both cases above, axioms 2 and 3 that we proposed will be violated. In order to 
address these issues, one needs a dynamic version of the Vickrey auction. 
 
 
6. The Vickrey “Share Auction” 
 
 As argued above, the Vickrey second-price auction has a number of limitations 
for use in spectrum auctions in developing countries including lack of competition, 
common value of the resource, aggressive bidding, third-party negotiations and value 
uncertainty. These issues prevail whether one uses a sealed-bid single-shot Vickrey 
auction, or an ascending price multiple round Vickrey auction. We propose a Vickrey 
“share auction” that would alleviate most of these problems. 
 
 The Vickrey share auction would work as follows: Each bidder would have to bid 
on the right to use the wireless spectrum, but would bid on the percentage (i.e. share) of 
total revenue that they would provide the government if they won. The winning bid 
would be the highest share bid, but the winner would only be asked to pay the second 
highest share bid. Thus, by using the second-highest share, one would get all of the 
incentive compatibility properties of the Vickrey auction. The question that most bidders 
would ask is for how long will they have to pay a percentage of their revenues? This will 
bring us to the second part to this share auction: The auctioneer, the developing country 
government, will have to place privately with a trusted authority, say the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court, it’s own valuation of how much the spectrum is worth. The winning 
bidder will continue paying a percentage of its revenue until the government’s assessed 
value of the spectrum is paid off. Thus, time period during which the winning bidder has 
to pay the license fee would be variable. 
 
 Note that this share auction has some of the good properties of the Vickrey 
auction: There is no incentive for the bidders to bid above their true assessment of what 
percentage of their revenues they are willing to pay the government each year. Further, 
making the share bids and the government’s valuation of it’s property rights public, there 
will no compromise regarding what each company would expect to make in this 
telecommunications venture. By having a simple mechanism, the problem of long 
arduous bidding as in the simultaneous ascending-price multiple round auction is also 
avoided. In the developing country context, keeping the auction short has significant 
merits as we have explained in the previous section. 
 
Conditions of axiom 1 will be satisfied because all participants are treated equally 
and fairly, transparency is maintained, and the rules are kept quite simple. Axiom 2 is 
also satisfied because the developing country government will obtain the revenue that 
they expect from the license auction. Clearly, they may not get the maximum amount in a 
more aggressive competition for the spectrum rights, but they will not feel compromised. 
The winning bidder only pays when revenue comes in, and the initial license fee as in 
previous spectrum auctions is not a cost “millstone” even before the network is built. 
Thus, there will be an incentive to build the wireless network as quickly as possible in 
order to obtain revenue and soon, get the government “off it’s back”. After the 
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government’s valuation is paid off, the total revenue is completely for the winning 
bidder. Thus, axiom 3 is also satisfied. Axiom 4 is easily satisfied. Third party suppliers 
do not know how much money is “left on the table” as in Vickrey auctions that are based 
on price alone. It will be difficult for the local suppliers to increase the price of inputs 
going into the network, thus keeping the network implementation cost low.  
 
One could say that this share auction is equivalent to having a price auction, and 
then the winning bidder and the government deciding on a payment schedule over time. 
Indeed, this is what is happening currently in India’s spectrum and wireline auctions. 
However, allowing the winning bidder and the government to negotiate a payment 
schedule after the auction has ended may allow corrupt practices to prevail, violating 
axiom 5. Further, the losing participants could claim that if they knew that the payment 
schedule could be negotiated, that they would have bid differently. If the perception was 
one of unfairness, then axiom 1 would certainly be violated. 
 
How does a bidder decide what to bid as the percentage of their revenues they 
will have to provide the government? The bidders will have to do the exact calculations 
that they performed in order to bid for the price auction. The will have to forecast the size 
of the market in terms of revenues that they can generate each year for the project life 
(usually 30 years). They will have to estimate the cost of building the network without 
the license fee. They will also have to make a judgment about reasonable rates of return 
on this project over the project life. Given these numbers, in the price auction they would 
back-out the maximum license fee that they would be willing to pay in order to ensure the 
rate of return. In the share auction, the calculations are the same except that instead of an 
upfront fixed cost of the licenses, they will have to include a percentage reduction of 
revenue each year for the project life. Any MBA with a spreadsheet should be able to see 
the equivalence of these two calculations, and back-out the maximum share that the 
bidder would be willing to pay. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Developing countries engaged in the deregulation of their telecommunications 
industry would be tempted to use some form of the simultaneous ascending multiple-
round (SAMR) auction to assign spectrum licenses. SAMR auction seem to be fair, 
generate revenue for the government, reveal firm’s estimates of license values, and assign 
licenses quickly compared to other methods like hearings, lotteries, and sealed-bid 
auctions, whether first-price or Vickrey second price auctions. SAMR auctions can also 
be designed to incorporate a wide range of public-policy goals as observed in New 
Zealand and the U.S. spectrum auctions.  
 
However, this will require firms to correctly compute the value of the differing 
licenses for their situation. In countries where it is difficult for firms to assess the value of 
having licenses due to poor market history (lack of data) may make allocation by auction 
risky since firms that have incorrectly valued licenses may receive licenses that they 
cannot use efficiently. The assumption is that firm bids do represent values and therefore 
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ability to use spectrum efficiently. Blindly using auctions can lead to very bad outcomes 
as witnessed in the early airwaves license auctions in Australia and New Zealand and so 
painstaking attention must be paid to all aspects of auction design and use, but there are 
some great precedents to make this process a lot easier. 
 
In this paper, we have suggested the use of a Vickrey “share auction” which takes 
into account the important axioms of auctioning spectrum in developing countries such as 
equal treatment of the bidders and fairness, revenue generation for the government, rapid 
build-out of the network, managing network cost after the auction is completed, and a 
rapid conclusion to the auction itself. Further work is necessary to provide a 
mathematically rigorous way of proving that, in theory, the Vickrey share auction would 
be superior to the Vickrey second-price auction. 
 
In a related paper that looked at natural resource concessions, such as oil and 
mineral concessions, Anandalingam (1987) showed, using mathematical bargaining 
theory, that a share contract would lead to the government (principal) obtaining a greater 
share of the property value under conditions of greater competition, and a willingness to 
share in production costs. Indeed, the share auction for spectrum allocation would make 
the government a partner interested in the success of the telecommunications venture. 
Given that the most important thing for a developing country is to have communications 
services and to become plugged into the Internet, anything that results in success should 
be intensely encouraged. 
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